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We are living through a particularly difficult and delicate period in the development of 
Britain as a multicultural, multiethnic and multi-faith society. Even before the terrorist 
attacks in London on 7 July 2005, racial, ethnic, and religious tensions had led to the 
beginnings of a re-evaluation of „multiculturalism‟ as a viable discourse for British society. 
Following the riots in Oldham and Bradford in the summer months of the year 2001, the 
Cantle Report introduced into public discourse terms such as „parallel lives‟ and „separate 
communities‟ which profoundly shifted the terms of debate about cultural diversity away 
from „multiculturalism‟ and towards „integration‟.1 The question of what „integration‟ 
actually means – integration into what? – is left open, however, and is filled with a silence 
that is all too eloquent a testimony to the absence of the mythical „common values‟ to 
which we should all supposedly subscribe. Nevertheless, politicians, journalists, and public 
figures from all backgrounds and political persuasions have increasingly fallen over 
themselves to attack multiculturalism as a divisive and devastating failure. 
This failure is premised on the belief that multiculturalism encourages 
„separateness‟ and „cultural segregation‟ and is in turn responsible for a situation in which, 
according to Ruth Kelly, the communities minister, „some communities [are] living in 
isolation of each other, with no common bonds between them.‟2 This rhetoric attaching 
multiculturalism to tropes of apartness, conflating diversity and difference with separation 
and isolation is axiomatic in all articulations of the new consensus. The recognition and 
celebration of cultural diversity, it is argued, is having real material consequences on the 
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ground in the form of ghetto communities and „parallel lives‟. Diversity of culture is 
adduced as the cause of division in life. But is there any substance to this charge? Has 
anyone joined the dots to test this hypothesis? Is it not, in fact, a culturalist argument which 
is based on a logical leap that denotes multiculturalism as a kind of scapegoat for social 
problems and issues which our government and society are unwilling and/or unable to 
confront? Why are clusters of minority ethnic communities living together in inner cities 
believed to be closing themselves off into „ghettoes‟ but super-rich people living in gated 
communities are not?Why should „culture‟ be especially responsible for social tensions 
between communities over and above other factors such as racism, class, economic 
deprivation, inadequate housing and social infrastructure, welfare dependency, white flight, 
and the importance of social networks in the construction of local neighbourhoods (i.e. the 
tendency to congregate with others who share similar cultural and class backgrounds, 
languages, beliefs and social practices). Fingering multiculturalism as the culprit occludes 
these other factors. 
This occlusion is in turn reinforced by confusion over the meaning of the term 
„multiculturalism‟. Multiculturalism signifies differently in different contexts. As a concept 
within philosophical discourse, for instance, it refers to the recognition, acceptance and 
respect for „culturally embedded differences‟.3 In sociological and policy circles, however, 
it refers to a particular mode of state behaviour informed by a more general notion, which 
circulates within what we might term the „public‟ context, that multiculturalism means 
„separate and distinct‟ cultures. This is indeed the governing principle within dominant 
public discourses of multiculturalism, which Sivanandan traces back to the Race Relations 
Act of 1976 and Lord Scarman‟s inquiry in the racial disturbances of the early 1980s. 
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„Official‟ multiculturalism, writes Sivanandan, emerged as particular response to the 
„ethnic disadvantage‟ identified by Scarman, and „the orthodoxy grew that the disaffection 
of Britain‟s black communities could be dealt with by funding a wide variety of ethnic and 
religious groups and projects. Meeting their cultural or ethnic needs would somehow stave 
off protests about inequality and injustice.‟4 As it is filtered through the machineries of state 
bureaucracies, this discourse of multiculturalism has manifested itself in state policies and 
bureaucratic behaviours that have, „set different communities against one another in a bid 
for funds…[and] began to entrench a dangerous ethnicised patronage in local politics.‟5 But 
whilst multiculturalism as state policy may indeed have helped define and construct 
„interests‟ in a manner that distinguished between groups based on „culture‟ and „ethnicity‟ 
it does not necessarily follow that it is therefore singularly responsible for the larger claim 
that it is responsible for ghettoes, isolated communities and, as recently suggested by the 
Conservative Shadow Home Secretary, „voluntary apartheid.‟  
For even in policy terms, multiculturalism‟s effects must be weighed in relation to 
its provenance within specific areas of policy. It is particularly important, for instance, in 
arts and cultural policy in setting the terms and priorities for funding but even the wildest 
critic of multiculturalism would surely be hard pressed to sincerely insist that arts funding 
is directly responsible for ethnic segregation and „parallel lives‟. Multiculturalism also 
informs educational policy but is it possible to advance an argument that the teaching of 
different cultural traditions – usually in a very attenuated form – is more likely to be 
responsible for community segregation than the tendency, for example, of white middle 
class parents to congregate in gentrified and expensive neighbourhoods so as to access 
good quality schools (or opt out of state schools altogether) leaving many schools in inner 
 4 
city areas with a preponderance of minority ethnic pupils. Here race, class and culture 
articulate into a dynamic that does indeed result in racial, cultural and, importantly, class 
segregation but this has little to do with multiculturalism. Moreover, the existence of faith 
schools pre-dates multiculturalism so to suggest that multiculturalism is responsible for the 
divisiveness engendered by the burgeoning of faith schools is only a half-truth. Whilst the 
claim for the extension of state-funded faith schools to non-Christian religious groups is 
made within from within the terms of multiculturalism, it is nevertheless the case that it 
could just as well be advanced independently of it on the basis of equality, redressing a 
clearly visible imbalance in educational provision. 
The dominant public discourse of multiculturalism is indeed flawed but critics of 
multiculturalism tend to inflate its effects and to conflate this flawed public discourse with 
all definitions and discourses of multiculturalism. In throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater they thus question the very possibility of multiculturalism. In other words, by 
setting the terms of debate in relation to the „failure‟ of multiculturalism, and in failing to 
distinguish between different kinds of multiculturalism, the solution is already anticipated 
as being something other than multiculturalism rather than a better multiculturalism. If 
multiculturalism is „fatally flawed‟ the „unflawed‟ alternative logically points towards a 
species of monoculturalism. What is apparent in the discursive strategies adopted by critics 
of multiculturalism is that it represents an ideological claim for a return to some form of 
assimilation. As Sivanandan perceptively notes, „There‟s a new ballgame here…the 
government‟s thinking this time [as opposed to the 1980s when multiculturalism emerged 
as an official discourse] was not along the lines of “ethnic disadvantage,” as Scarman had 
it, but of (too much) ethnic advantage, too much multiculturalism…Cultural pluralism has 
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gone too far, it threatens our values and our very national safety. A line has to be drawn on 
difference.‟6  
The silence that accompanies the call to „integrate‟ does not merely denote the 
absence of the common values that define „Britishness‟, nor does it suggest merely the 
deferral of the response to the question „integrate into what?‟ in the absence of a suitable 
answer, but rather it also suggests a response that dare not speak its name (yet): integration 
is equivalent to assimilation. This is encoded in the use, for example, of the trope of 
„allaying‟ majority (read: white, native) fears about „change‟ and „globalisation‟ – a polite 
form of pandering to racist and nativist prejudices in the name of „community cohesion‟.7 
This particularly deft dialectical manoeuvre figures the anxieties of the white majority as a 
legitimate object of concern whilst pretending these have nothing to do with racism; at the 
same time, it suggests that only white native Britons‟ fears and anxieties need to be 
addressed, and, conversely, that minorities do not have fears and anxieties of their own 
(which are usually related, of course, to the anxious and fearful prejudicial behaviours of 
white Britons). Finally, a veneer of political correctness is added to imply that all of this is 
being done in the service of cultural diversity. In other words, the rhetoric of „community 
cohesion‟ is deployed so as to obscure the implications of this new attitude towards 
multiculturalism: the addressing of the white majority‟s „concerns‟ is another way of saying 
that they need not change but all „others‟ must. 
The irony is, of course, that the assimilationist model which many Britons are now 
slyly advocating in response to 7/7 and all the rest of it would, just a few months 
afterwards, go up in smoke in the banlieus of France. Despite this the momentum is 
growing; the chorus is getting louder. „Community cohesion‟ – the new favourite term – 
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requires a „new and honest debate‟ about the „value‟ of multiculturalism.8 But the debate, 
far from being „honest‟ is in fact characterised by silence, evasion and euphemism at every 
turn. Just as there is no mention of assimilation, so too is it deemed correct not to single out 
Muslims even though it is quite obvious to all that the „problem‟ of integration is being 
addressed, first and foremost, to Britain‟s Muslim communities. The failure of 
multiculturalism is, in fact, a displaced way of talking about the failure of the Muslim 
community (almost always spoken of in the singular) to integrate. In other words, the 
critique of multiculturalism is a means by which to talk about the „problem‟ of Islam in 
Britain without appearing to be Islamophobic. It is not coincidental that the shift in attitude 
toward multiculturalism should have begun in 2001, following the Oldham and Bradford 
riots and 9/11. Since then, the „crisis‟ of cultural diversity has been adduced with reference 
to a depressing series of increasingly hysterical reactions to Muslim „issues‟: the French 
debate about the hijab overlaps quite nicely with the controversy in Britain concerning the 
veil; the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh and the Danish cartoons echo the 
furore over The Satanic Verses; and then there are the terrorist plots: 9/11, 7/7, the alleged 
plot of July 2006, each reprising the previous one in an echo-chamber of associations. 
Each controversy is figured as in some way a threat to a „way of life‟: the French 
republic stands or falls on the choice of headwear by Muslim schoolgirls; the Dutch model 
of liberal tolerance needs to be reappraised; Danes ask if Danish values are being 
undermined. Here in Britain we ask if it is possible to integrate fully if our faces our 
covered, and we are asked to consider the implications for community relations and the 
obstruction to „communication‟ it may represent. These are legitimate issues for debate, of 
course, and were initially raised in a sensitive and thoughtful manner by Jack Straw before 
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the subsequent brouhaha engulfed it. As it has since developed, the increasingly hysterical 
tone of the press coverage seems to carry with it the suggestion that a small number of 
women wearing the niqab threaten the basis of an „open‟ society by – and the tropes are 
very important – „closing‟ themselves off.9  
Although there is considerable and legitimate debate about the conceptual validity, 
scope and definition of Islamophobia it is surely appropriate to denote the persistent 
figuring of Islam and Muslims as a „problem‟ as Islamophobic. In this incredibly multi-
faceted, ambiguous, evolving and flexible discourse, Islam and Muslims are positioned as a 
„limit‟ – both in the sense of being at the limit of (and therefore „beyond‟) a putative „way 
of life‟, and in the sense of being a limit on (i.e. obstructing: cf. the veil controversy) that 
way of life. Islam tests these limits – of freedom of speech, of tolerance, of diversity – and 
it thus represents the limitations of multiculturalism. 
It is easy enough to recognise all this when it is articulated from the right by John 
Bull nationalists, racists and xenophobes. More troubling is the way in which liberal and 
leftist critiques of multiculturalism silently and euphemistically articulate these positions. 
In the „new ballgame‟, those who had hitherto espoused multiculturalism as an axiom of 
contemporary political discourse now see a crisis and failure of that multiculturalism and 
encode within their arguments the unvoiced assumption that this has been largely, if not 
solely, brought about by the „problem‟ of Islam. They conclude that multiculturalism has 
failed precisely because they cannot see beyond Islam as a problem. And yet, there is 
another possibility that leads to a very different argument: that the presence of „Islam‟ as a 
problem within the discourse of multiculturalism does not so much reveal Islam to be a 
problem, nor does it demonstrate the failure of multiculturalism per se; rather, it illuminates 
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the failure of liberalism and a liberal political culture to articulate a multiculturalist 
discourse that is able to accommodate religious as well as ethnic and cultural diversity. In 
order to demonstrate this, I want to perform what might be termed an anatomical reading 
of the prevailing public discourses of multiculturalism, dissecting it so as to show how and 
why, as a body of thought about cultural diversity, it finds Islam somewhat indigestible. 
This indigestion is itself a symptom of a deeper crisis of secular knowledge – and of those 
discourses that have emerged from it, such as liberalism – in the fraught and paradoxical 
context of globalization. 
 
In June 2003, the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC), a government advisory body, 
published a report calling for, amongst other things, the termination of an exemption clause 
in animal welfare legislation that allows Jewish and Islamic butchers to practise ritual 
slaughter methods known as schechita and halal respectively. Arguing that the exemption 
from stunning an animal prior to its slaughter – an act which contradicts both Jewish and 
Muslim edicts that the animal in question should be absolutely uninjured before the 
commencement of the ritual – causes extreme suffering, it argues that Jews and Muslims, if 
they want to continue their ritual practices, must submit to the necessity of partially 
stunning the animal first. This, argues FAWC, would be a more „humane‟ way of 
conducting schechita and halal. 
What we have here, in a condensed form, is that clash of moral and cultural values which 
probes deep into the heart of what it means to be a multiculturalist society.
10
 The FAWC 
report is especially interesting for two reasons. Firstly, because it is sensitive to the 
multicultural context of modern Britain and so it implicitly considers how best to promote a 
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sense of multiculturalism that makes it compatible with what it sees as universally valid 
norms concerning „humane‟ behaviour towards animals. Second, these norms are premised 
upon secularist notions of value and of state. Part of the problem, it feels, is that the 
exemption is a state intervention that is contrary to the secular „humane‟ values that the 
state should be upholding. In order to be consistent with itself, the state should remove such 
an exemption. The report espouses a kind of secularism similar to the republican models in 
France and Turkey. The state should be absolutely neutral and separate from religious 
involvement (hence the exemption should be removed); but in so doing it should promote 
secularist values over and above religious values. This is supposed to guarantee greater 
religious toleration in a multicultural society. 
The ambiguities, hesitancies and contradictions in the report‟s recommendations 
illuminate a distinct problem when current discourses of multiculturalism are deployed in 
assessing the validity or otherwise of specific religious practices (as opposed to vague 
inanities about the value of pluralism etc.). It did not actually call for a proscription of ritual 
slaughter; on the other hand, it leaves no room for doubt that it considers such practices 
„inhumane‟. The resulting compromise neither satisfied its own secular humanist logic nor 
did it assuage the offence felt by Muslims and Jews.   
The discomfort arises from the fact that until recently, multiculturalism rarely 
addressed the issue of religious diversity. This may sound strange to us now, after the 
Rushdie affair and September 11, and after the rhetoric that surrounded both wars in the 
Gulf, or the war in Afghanistan, or the euphemistic „war on terror‟. However, it should be 
borne in mind that the „western‟ history of thinking about cultural relations has been 
profoundly shaped by secularism so that religion is not something that was, until recently, 
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spoken of as something „cultural‟ in the sense that, say, ethnicity or nationality was. Philip 
Lewis has observed in his book Islamic Britain, that as recently as the mid-1980s, „the 
majority of those concerned with race relations in Britain....still thought of the religious 
identity of the country‟s ethnic minorities as a somewhat marginal issue‟.11 He goes on to 
say that the issue was subsumed under „multiculturalism‟, which was emerging then as a 
new way of talking about cultural relations that explicitly rejected the earlier 
„assimilationist‟ discourse. Assimilation had seen immigrants as more or less free-floating 
individuals, whose „difference‟ was not culturally embedded but racially determined. 
Assimilation and the discourse of „race relations‟ thus shared the same genealogy. The 
logic was that the problem of „race‟ could be, if not resolved completely (for race was seen 
as a „natural‟ and not cultural difference), then at least attenuated if everyone – „white‟, 
„black‟, „brown‟, „yellow‟ – shared the same culture. It was, perhaps, a well-meaning but 
misguided attempt at addressing racism that was itself prejudicial and culturally, if not 
always racially, arrogant.
12
  
Multiculturalism shifted this discourse on race relations towards acceptance of 
diversity as opposed to its rejection. Emerging from a liberal discourse, however, early 
multiculturalism adopted the liberal distinction between public and private spheres. Unlike 
the individualist liberalism that underwrote the assimilationist doctrine, it accepted that 
individuals were culturally embedded and that these cultures should be accepted in the 
public sphere. However, only certain aspects of culture were seen as publicly important: in 
particular, race, ethnicity, nationality, gender and sexuality. Other differences, such as 
religion and language, were to  be reserved for the private or domestic sphere. In other 
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words, only the secular aspects of culture were recognised within the discourse of early 
multiculturalism. 
Things began to change, however, with the „Rushdie affair‟. It is significant that 
the shift was initiated by Muslims, and it has been sustained since by developments, both 
domestic and international, that have circulated through the channels of a globalized media 
and shaped perceptions and positions on the nature of the relationship of religion (Islam in 
particular) to public life. Indeed, there is the risk in the current global environment that 
from being invisible within the discourse of cultural relations, religion has now become the 
dominant, if not only, determinant of it.  
The Rushdie affair had followed on from the Honeyford affair in which a 
headmaster in a Bradford school that had a majority of Muslim pupils had challenged the 
parents‟ insistence that certain aspects of their Muslim traditions should be respected within 
the public space of the school. The Satanic Verses controversy illuminated other areas in 
which Muslims struggled for public recognition of their religious identity. This struggle has 
been at least partially successful, though there is still a hesitancy and some confusion over 
how to accommodate religion (and Islam in particular) within the discourse of 
multiculturalism, as we can see with the FAWC report. In turn, there has been a slow 
displacement of race relations by religious relations. However, the older secularist tradition 
still makes itself felt in the continuing confusion over how to talk about religious identity. 
Firstly, the older influence of race relations is manifest in the popular assumption that 
Muslims are non-white, and in particular are South Asian. Two things follow from this: 
„race‟ continues to be used to describe the „majority‟ community (assumed, silently, to be 
Christian), but is increasingly being displaced by religion when applied to minority 
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communities – the term Asian, or South Asian co-exists now in public discourse with 
„Muslims‟, „Hindus, „Sikhs‟ etc. On the one hand, this recognises some of the differences 
that fissure racial and ethnic classifications; on the other hand, religious identity substitutes 
the ethnic one. In other words, there is the worrying tendency within public multicultural 
discourse to speak of religious identities only in relation to ethnic minorities, which merely 
underlies secularist assumptions about the „majority‟ community. This indeterminacy 
testifies to the difficulty British multiculturalist discourse is having in dealing with religion 
as a significant dimension of culture in an increasingly post-secularist social space. 
The problem is not only historical but also theoretical. Multiculturalism as a 
discourse only makes sense in relation to the nation-state, that is, within the framework of a 
specific way of thinking about the relationship between the state, culture and territory. 
Multiculturalism can only exist as a concept within a certain defined space: it is the nature 
of that space that is important (if we take the space to be global, the obvious „fact‟ of 
cultural diversity has given rise, in the age of nations, to another discourse of cultural 
relations, namely internationalism). Multiculturalism, like the concept of „nation‟ which 
makes it possible, is therefore a spatial concept. The „multi‟ is related to a social space that 
is territorially defined within the boundaries of a particular state. The significance of this 
fundamental relation to nationhood is that the nation-state emerged from an increasing 
secularism with respect to discourses of power, authority and culture. Intercultural relations 
were also accordingly secularized.  
Prior to the emergence of nations, however, cultural relations were spoken of in 
largely religious terms, as sectarian difference or as a distinction between „believers‟ and 
„pagans‟ or „infidels‟.13 It was from the 12th century onwards that medieval Europeans, their 
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world-view inevitably filtered through the prism of Christianity, first began that process of 
encountering cultures other than the Abrahamic religions, whom they were accustomed to 
seeing as heretical sects or heterodoxical versions of Christianity (especially Islam). 
However, the voyages which prefaced and then produced colonialism introduced them to 
differences which were not only religious and doctrinal but which encompassed the whole 
span of cultural activity. Two ideas of human diversity, which shadowed and coalesced 
with each other throughout, began to emerge to explain these more fundamental and 
comprehensive differences: nation and race. It is not surprising, therefore, that these 
became the two dominant explanatory paradigms of human differences in the western 
tradition and remain so even today. 
Indeed, both nation and race, but the former in particular, were means by which 
Europe could speak about difference in a new, secular register and thus overcome its own 
endemic religious conflicts. Throughout the medieval and early modern period Europe was 
riven by religious dissension which in turn overlapped with and sometimes fed into 
political strife. Secularism was therefore not just a means of dealing with cultural diversity; 
it was also a means of stabilising the state so that it could by-pass the problem of religious 
diversity. Political thinkers like Hobbes looked on in envy at the unrivalled religious 
tolerance within the Ottoman empire. His Leviathan was perhaps the most influential of a 
number of attempts to theorize the basis for a secular state embodied in the authority of an 
absolute ruler. The theory of the absolutist state began the process of abstracting the 
individual of any significant affiliations other than those owed to the state. In time it was to 
prove the basis for the modern nation-state. In the process, however, it was profoundly 
shaped by the rise of the other ancestor of multiculturalism, namely liberalism. 
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The modern state has been characterized by Bikhu Parekh as „a historically unique 
mode of defining and relating its members,‟ to each other „as an association of individuals. 
It abstracts away their class, ethnicity, religion, social status and so forth, and unites them 
in terms of their subscription to a common system of authority...To be a citizen is to 
transcend one‟s ethnic, religious and other particularities...Because their socially generated 
differences are abstracted away, citizens are homogenized and related to the state in an 
identical manner‟.14 It was liberalism that worked out the place and status of the individual, 
his or her relationship as a citizen to the state, and the rights and obligations this enjoined. 
Because of its abstraction of the individual, liberalism is popularly assumed to be 
culturally „neutral‟ and therefore the best way of accommodating cultural and religious 
diversity. Liberals commonly arrogate a monopoly on tolerance and open-mindedness. 
They justify this on the basis of their theorization of the distinction between public and 
private spheres in which the rules of the public sphere are clear and which enable the 
individual to hold whatever views he or she likes as long as they do not break those rules. 
Similarly, an individual can, within the private sphere and domestic space, have any 
number of cultural affiliations, and perform any number of practices. Since these have no 
bearing on their relationship to the state or their public performance as citizens, they are 
perfectly at liberty to continue with them providing, once again, that they do not break the 
law as formulated by the society of citizens as a whole.  
However, if we look a little closer, we find that liberalism is neither culturally 
„neutral‟ nor is it able to provide a sufficient vocabulary or philosophical framework 
through which to resolve cultural differences. For one thing, liberalism finds it extremely 
difficult to account for culture at all. The individual, abstracted out of any form of cultural 
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affiliation, is related directly to the state. To this way of thinking, culture is a secondary 
matter. Liberalism is therefore not able to account for the importance individuals may place 
on aspects of their  culture, an importance which at times may not seem rational at all. In 
part, this is due to the rather idealist notion within liberalism that the individual is a free-
floating rational entity that transcends its particular environment and for whom history, 
tradition and culture are no more than raw material to be used instrumentally for the 
pursuance of his or her self-defined interests. It does not recognise that the individual is 
embedded in a culture through which he or she is able to construct the meaning of the 
world which they inhabit and of the „identity‟ that constitutes their selfhood. It is precisely 
because of this that liberalism is, in fact, ill-equipped to mediate cultural difference because 
it provides no mechanisms by which to understand why or how those differences might be 
important and worth cherishing. 
For another thing, although in theory liberalism sees only the relationship between 
the state and the individual as mediated through the law as important, in practice it does 
need to ground itself in a culture for the law cannot be an abstract body of doctrines but 
rather must reflect the values and sensibilities of those who create and adhere to it. In other 
words, the making of laws „presupposes a shared body of values amongst the state‟s 
population such that the authority of the law is recognized as being generally valid.‟15 The 
liberal concept of citizenship is not therefore merely a politico-legal concept but also a 
cultural one.  Historically,nationalism has provided the cultural glue that binds together the 
liberal theory of state, that fastens the individual to the state. This is why it has been said 
that all liberals are, in fact, „liberal nationalists‟, whether they admit it or not.  
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As I have already stated, liberalism has, historically and theoretically, been at the 
root of the assimilationist doctrine of cultural relations. Religion – as well as other forms of 
cultural affiliation – were seen as a problem precisely because they threatened to provide 
alternative foci of loyalty to that of the nation state, or alternative assessments of the body 
of values which underwrite its authority. This potential disturbance to the stability of the 
state and its laws is what underlies the assimilationist demand for cultural homogeneity as a 
corollary to legal equality. 
Recently, however, some liberal theorists have attempted to account for cultural 
diversity whilst still preserving the spirit of liberalism by rejecting the doctrine of 
assimilation.
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 They have done so by going back to liberalism‟s first principles, which posit 
a distinction between the public and private realms. Within the terms of this framework, the 
public sphere consists of the state and civil society. John Rawls has advocated acceptance 
of cultural diversity in the public sphere so long as it is confined to certain areas of civil 
society and other „non-political‟ branches of the state. The one aspect of the public sphere 
that must remain reserved for liberalism is what he terms the „political realm‟. His 
liberalism is accordingly thinned down to the bare minimum necessary to conduct political 
but not necessarily any other form of life – those can be lived according to the cultural 
preoccupations of individuals. However, this kind of political liberalism merely reduces the 
more comprehensive assimilationism of previous liberal thought to a narrower, politically 
defined assimilation into liberal values which become the only legitimate and acceptable 
standard by which to conduct political life. Again, this might have been sufficient were it 
not for the rather awkward fact that since politics involves the contestation and regulation 
of different forces within society, and since such forces must be culturally embedded, 
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politics necessarily invokes culture and involves the negotiation of or conflict between the 
values they articulate. Rawls‟s political liberalism once again overlooks the fact that 
liberalism is itself a culture with its own set of values that are not necessarily those of 
everyone else. To reserve the political realm for this culture is to put all non-liberal cultures 
at a significant political disadvantage. 
This kind of displaced assimilation generally goes by the name, nowadays, of 
integration. This is the kind of integration advocated by the current political consensus . It 
accepts „plurality‟ but demands that ethnic and religious minorities in turn accept British 
„norms and values‟. It never quite specifies what these are but the structure of the demand 
makes it clear that, first, there is a set of British „norms and values‟, and secondly, that in 
order to participate fully in the British „way of life‟ people of other cultures, faiths or 
traditions must give moral priority to British „values‟ over and above their own. 
This prioritising of liberal values – though it is not easy to classify the current 
political climate as liberal – and the subsequent identification of nonliberal with illiberal is 
often justified on the grounds that „since modern western society is liberal, it is entitled to 
ask its members to live by basic liberal values.‟ Bikhu Parekh, for one, has shown up the 
muddle-headedness of such thinking. He points out that there is no reason to accept even 
the premise that western society is basically liberal. For one thing, there are plenty of 
homegrown nonliberal groups all of which are unproblematically assumed to be part of the 
British „way of life‟: conservatives, communists, socialists, certain Christian communities, 
and so on.Indeed, in the case of the conservatives, their political identity is based on the 
premise that they are the only true representatives of the „British way of life‟. As Parekh 
then goes on to say, „The fact that its political and economic institutions and some of its 
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social practices are liberal does not make its entire way of life liberal any more than the fact 
that the state is largely secular entitles us to call the whole society secular.‟17 
This last analogy illuminates an interesting point about the nature of public and 
political discourse in Britain today, for it demonstrates that some nonliberal systems of 
thought are acceptable as legitimate political languages – conservatism, socialism etc. – 
whilst others are not. In other words, liberalism can accommodate those political languages 
that share its secularist logic; those that do not are entitled to participate in certain areas of 
the public sphere but are viewed suspiciously, even intolerantly, when they try to articulate 
a politics. The dominant discourse on multiculturalism shares this secularist logic. Whilst it 
has been acceptable to articulate a political agenda using the discourse of multiculturalism 
based on secular aspects of cultural identity such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, or nationality, 
multiculturalists have long been suspicious of religious politics. In recent times, the 
celebratory rhetoric of Britain‟s multicultural fabric has accentuated such secular fusions as 
British Indian cuisine, or Afro-Caribbean dance music, but the calling of the faithful to 
prayer or the building of Hindu temples has been received less with suspicion than with 
muted indifference. It seems that whilst some things are worthy of celebration, others are 
not.  
Increasingly, many religious groups, but especially Muslims, are challenging this 
secular multiculturalism, and perhaps the general Islamophobia still pervading many areas 
of British life can be attributed to a visceral response to this challenge. Nevertheless, it is 
having an effect on the formulation of multiculturalism, and many thinkers are beginning to 
grapple with the problem of incorporating a religious dimension into multiculturalist 
discourse.  
 19 
It is being increasingly recognized that the liberal theory of a neutral state is a ruse. 
As we have seen, liberals implicitly equate „neutrality‟ with liberalism, which 
disadvantages non-liberal and especially non-secular groups. It is now recognised that the 
state itself, if representing a multicultural society, must be shaped by it so that 
multiculturalism becomes the definitive principle of the state and its institutions. This must 
be accompanied by what Parekh calls a „weak‟ secularism in which the political machinery 
of the state remains separate from religion whilst certain branches of the state, such as 
education, embrace religious diversity. The logic of these positions demands a certain 
nonliberalism in order to contest prevailing social and cultural inequalities in the form of 
„positive‟ or „affirmative‟ action – and this is deeply resented in some quarters on both 
liberal and nonliberal grounds.  
Moreover, this multicultural demand for positive action flows not only from the 
logic that the state should be representative of its multicultural society but also from the 
fact that the liberal division of the public from the private spheres is fallacious. The state 
penetrates deep into the private realm, shaping subjectivity and making demands of 
cultures, communities and individuals that, in classic liberal theory, it should not. It is not 
surprising that cultural communities should, in turn, make demands of the state (and other 
parts of the so-called public sphere). The problem now is not that they should do so, but 
how this is to be done. It is a problem that centres on the incommensurability of the 
languages in which these demands are articulated – between, say, liberalism and nonliberal 
religious ones. Some languages may perhaps be more convergent than others. What 
concerns us here is the problem that Islam poses in this respect. 
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I would argue that it is no coincidence that of all the religions that have challenged 
the secular-liberalism of both the state and the multiculturalism, it is Islam that has been the 
most visible, radical, controversial and determined – a list of adjectives to which some may 
also add confrontational. Islam poses specific problems for secular-liberal multiculturalism.  
In part, this is due to a rather surprising and ironic parallelism between the structure of the 
modern state and that of the Islamic concept of the state on the one hand, and between the 
concept of the individual in Islam and liberal individualism on the other. 
Let us return to Parekh‟s concise definition of the modern state as one that 
recognizes only „individuals are bearers of rights and [seeks] to create a homogeneous legal 
space made up of uniform political units subject to the same body of laws and institutions. 
It set[s] about dismantling long-established communities and [reunites] the “emancipated” 
individuals on the basis of a collectively accepted and centralized structure of authority.‟18 
Insofar as Islam theoretically envisions all Muslims as equal, this characterization  of the 
modern state could, with a little modification, also be applied to the Islamic theory of 
state.
19
 Moreover, the Islamic conceptualization of the individual possesses remarkable 
similarities to that proposed by liberalism: in both the individual possesses a primacy over 
and above other categories. This parallelism between Islamic individualism and liberal 
individualism rests, in turn, on the ambiguous nature and place of culture – in both systems 
of thought – as a mediator/medium in which and through which the individual lives his or 
her life. Theoretically, in Islam the individual has a direct relationship to Allah regardless 
of the specificities of his or her cultural affiliations. However, it is only within the culture 
of Islam itself that this is possible, or, to put it another way, the relationship to Allah is 
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mediated through the divine law, the sharia.
20
 This is what ultimately guarantees Islam‟s 
tolerance of cultural and (in attenuated form) religious diversity.
21
  
Similarly, liberalism sees a direct and unmediated relationship between the 
individual and the state and also discounts cultural affiliation. Once again, this indifference 
that is the basis of its tolerance of cultural diversity is guaranteed by the culture of 
liberalism itself and mediated through the law. In both cases, the foundational culture is not 
seen as a culture at all but is seen instead as the „truth‟.22 In both cases, the foundational 
culture is the universal ground against which cultural diversity can be measured and within 
which cultural difference is both embedded and transcended. Both liberalism and Islam are 
themselves not part of this diversity, however, nor can their specificities be measured on a 
scale of cultural value because they are not „cultural‟ but „natural‟, representing the „true‟ 
order of life and the universe. 
It is the fact that both liberalism and Islam fasten the individual to their respective 
points of authority via a body of public law that creates the particular problem of Islam for 
any theory of multiculturalism based on liberalism. Islam proposes a very specific relation 
between each Muslim and the state based on a body of public law encompassing both 
criminal and civil law. Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, and most other religions (with the 
possible exception of Judaism) do not.
23
 This public law requires a state to enforce it. 
However, this law is fashioned on non-secularist principles that are incommensurable with 
liberalism. It is precisely this paradoxical similarity and incommensurable difference that 
contributes to the difficulty in reconciling Islam with liberalism. . It even poses a problem 
for the „weak‟ secularism proposed by Parekh as even then there would be certain arenas of 
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law, especially criminal law and also some aspects of civil law relating especially, but not 
exclusively, to gender that are not easily commensurable.  
Some Muslims and some liberals interpret this difficulty as an irresolvable conflict 
between Islamic and liberal principles and conclude that the only resolution would be for 
either Islam or liberalism to emerge dominant and victorious. Such Muslims speak of an 
Islamic state in Britain, and represent a tiny minority of Muslims; a larger proportion of 
liberals  would like to see all Muslims becoming secularised counterparts to secularized 
Christians, observing their faith within the private sphere. In the current climate, it is 
difficult to prevent these extreme positions from intruding into the mainstream of public 
discourse. However, it is the principle of „resolution‟ itself that must first be rejected. If a 
better, more adequate post-secular multiculturalism is to emerge it will only do so in that 
provisional space in which resolution is suspended in favour of permanent dialogic 
negotiation; a space in which both liberal and Islamic principles can be accommodated as 
equal players in the refashioning of public discourse on intercultural relations – along, of 
course, with other traditions and principles too. The opening of such a space would require 
an ethical endeavour that refuses the legalism and moralism to which certain Islamists and 
liberals seem especially prone. The automatic invocation of „rights‟ on the one hand, and 
the ritual evocation of „offence‟ on the other  currently diverts all intercultural 
communication into the cul-de-sac of incommensurability. The ethical accommodation of 
each Other offers the only tentative route through the impasse and if it does so – if it can 
only do so – in an ad hoc, issue-by-issue manner, then so be it. In the process, ethical 
accommodation might just begin to transform the politics of cultural relations, rejecting 
conflict in favour of compromise, and replacing hostility and suspicion with mutual respect. 
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